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Abstract—Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the Internet use BGP
to perform interdomain routing. BGP routing policies are mainly
determined by the business relationships between neighboring
ASes, which can be classified into three types: provider-to-
customer, peer-to-peer, and sibling-to-sibling. ASes usually do
not export provider routes and peer routes to providers or
peers. It has been proved that if all ASes conform to this
common export policy then all AS paths are valley-free. Since
AS relationships are not publicly available, several studies have
proposed heuristic algorithms for inferring AS relationships using
publicly available BGP data. Most of these algorithms rely
on the valley-free property of AS paths. However, not all AS
paths are valley-free because some ASes do not conform to the
common export policy. As a result, inferred AS relationship are
inaccurate. Instead of inferring AS relationships, we propose an
algorithm for computing observed AS relationships based on
transit relationships between ASes that are revealed by BGP
data. We analyze the types of mismatches between observed
AS relationships and actual AS relationships and show that the
mismatches can be used to identify ASes that violate the common
export policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet connects tens of thousands of autonomous
systems (ASes) operated by different administrative entities.
Routing between ASes is determined by the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP). BGP is a policy-driven interdomain routing
protocol that allows each AS to choose its own policy in
determining which routes to import from and export to its
neighbors. ASes engage in business relationships to exchange
data traffic and routing policies of ASes are largely determined
by the business relationships between neighboring ASes.
AS relationships can be broadly classified into three types:
provider-to-customer (p2c), peer-to-peer (p2p), and sibling-
to-sibling (s2s). In the p2c relationship, the customer pays
the provider for transiting traffic from and to the rest of the
Internet. In the p2p relationship, two ASes freely exchange
traffic between themselves and their customers, but do not
exchange traffic from or to their providers or other peers. In
the s2s relationship, two ASes freely transit traffic for each
other. A natural outcome of this economic model is that an AS
usually does not export its provider routes and peer routes to
its providers or peers. Gao [1] proved that if all ASes conform
to this common export policy, then all AS paths are valley-
free (i.e., a p2c edge or p2p edge can only be followed by p2c
or s2s edges in an AS path). This implies that a non-valley-
free path (or valley path) must contain an AS that violates the
common export policy.
Knowing the business relationships between ASes is impor-
tant for understanding the Internet’s structure, inter-domain
routing dynamics, and evolution. However, AS relationship
data are usually not publicly disclosed. Some studies have
proposed heuristic algorithms for inferring AS relationships
using publicly available BGP data [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7].
Most of these algorithms either assume AS paths are valley-
free or aim to maximize the number of valley-free AS paths.
However, it has been found that a large number of AS paths in
BGP updates and BGP routing tables are not valley-free [8],
[9]. Thus, inferred AS relationships are inaccurate and biased
towards valley-free paths. Some studies have used inferred AS
relationships to identify valley paths and policy violating ASes
in these paths [10], [8]. The results can contain both false
positives and false negatives due to inaccuracy of inferred AS
relationships.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to obtaining
AS relationships using BGP data. Instead of inferring AS
relationships based on the valley-free property, we develop
an algorithm for computing observed AS relationships based
on transit relationships between ASes revealed by BGP data.
By comparing observed AS relationships with actual AS
relationships, we can identify policy violating ASes without
identifying valley paths in the first place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides an overview of the related work. In Section III we
define types of AS relationships, common export policies, and
the valley-free condition. Section IV presents our algorithm for
computing observed AS relationships using BGP data. Section
V presents how observed AS relationships can be used to
identify ASes that violate the common export policies. Section
VI presents our results on observed AS relationships and their
application on identifying policy violating ASes. Finally, we
conclude our paper and outline our future work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The AS relationship inference problem was first studied
in Gao’s seminal work [1]. Gao proved that AS paths are
valley-free if all ASes obey the common export policies and
developed heuristic algorithms for inferring AS relationships
based on the patterns of valley-free paths. Xia and Gao [2]
show that Gao’s algorithm has low accuracy on p2p relation-
ship inference and propose a new algorithm that significantly
improves the p2p accuracy by exploiting partial ground truth
AS relationships obtained from BGP community attributes and
IRR databases.
Subramanian et al. [3] define the Type of Relationship
(ToR) problem, which is to assign a type (p2c or p2p, s2s not
considered) to each edge in the AS graph derived from a set
of BGP paths such that the total number of valley-free paths
is maximized. They conjecture that the ToR problem is NP-
complete and present a heuristic algorithm for the problem that
exploits views from multiple vantage points. The algorithm
generates a directed AS graph from each view and assigns
a rank to each AS based on its position in the graph. The
relationship between two ASes are then inferred by comparing
their rankings in different views. Di Battista et al. [4] prove
that the ToR problem is NP-complete and present heuristics
for solving the problem in the general case. They also develop
an algorithm for determining the AS relationships in the case
in which the problem admits a solution without valley-free
violations. Dimitropoulos et al. [6] identify the limitations
of the ToR formulation that lead to incorrect inferences and
present heuristics to more accurately infer AS relationships.
They add a second objective to the ToR problem formulation
that encourages assignment of p2c relationship along the node
degree gradient. Similar to Gao’s algorithm, they infer p2p
relationships by considering edges adjacent to the top provider
of each AS path and assigning p2p relationship if the degree
difference of the two ASes is smaller than a threshold. s2s
relationships are inferred by searching the IRR databases for
ASes belonging to the same organization.
Oliveira et al. [5] propose an algorithm for inferring AS
relationships using BGP data collected from routers in Tier-1
ASes. The algorithm infers p2c and p2p links based on the
no-valley premise. Specifically, if an AS path is revealed by
a Tier-1 router, then the first link in the path is either a p2p
link or a p2c link and the rest of the links are p2c links. The
type of the first link can be determined based on whether the
link is visible from another Tier-1 AS.
Luckie et al. [7] present an algorithm for inferring p2c and
p2p relationships that does not rely on the valley-free property.
The algorithm ranks ASes by placing a clique of transit-free
ASes at the top, and then sort other ASes by transit degree
and node degree. p2c relationships are inferred top-down using
this ranking and all remaining links are classified as p2p.
Inferred AS relationships have been used to detect and
analyze valley paths in BGP updates [10], [8]. Mahajan et
al. [10] analyzed BGP updates to identify short-lived AS
paths that violate the valley-free condition as probable export
misconfigurations and polled the ISP operators involved to
verify if it was a misconfiguration and to learn the cause
of the misconfiguration. Qiu et al. [8] quantitatively char-
acterize BGP updates that violate the valley-free condition
over a four-month period. It was found that 1.4% of the
BGP updates contain valleys and a substantial percentage of
prefixes are affected by valleys. The authors further propose
a solution to guard against valley routes by adding state to
BGP advertisements that reflects the pattern of the advertised
AS path. Giotsas and Zhou [9] argue that using inferred AS
relationships cannot provide an objective assessment of valley-
free violations because AS relationship inference algorithms
assume the universality of valley-free paths, which causes
the inferred AS relationships to be biased towards valley-
free paths. To address the problem, they extract ground truth
AS relationships from routing policies encoded in the BGP
community attribute and use this bias-free AS relationship
dataset to assess valley-free violations in BGP updates and
BGP routing tables. It was found that valley paths are more
frequent than reported in [8] and a significant fraction of valley
paths are the outcome of complex business relationships and
deliberate policies as opposed to a result of BGP misconfigu-
ration.
Inferred AS relationships have also been used to study AS
path inference [11], Internet evolution [12], impact of prefix
hijacking [13], [14], and in simulation-based evaluation of
new BGP route selection schemes [15] and new inter-domain
routing protocols [16].
III. AS RELATIONSHIPS, COMMON EXPORT POLICIES,
AND THE VALLEY-FREE CONDITION
AS relationships can be broadly classified into three types:
provider-to-customer (p2c), peer-to-peer (p2p), and sibling-to-
sibling (s2s). A pair of ASes (X, Y) has p2c relationship if
X transits traffic for Y and Y does not transit traffic for X.
Here, X is the provider and Y is the customer. X and Y have
p2p relationship if all traffic carried on the link between X
and Y is originated from X (Y) or its downstream customers
and destined to Y (X) or its downstream customers. X and Y
have s2s relationship if X transits traffic for Y and Y transits
traffic for X. That is, siblings provide mutual transit for each
other.
AS relationships can be represented by an AS graph where
nodes represent ASes and edges represent the business rela-
tionships between ASes. The p2c relationship is represented
by two directed edges: a p2c edge from the provider to the
customer and a c2p edge from the customer to the provider.
The p2p and s2s relationships are represented by undirected
edges. If AS pair (X, Y) has p2p (s2s) relationship, then there
is an undirected p2p (s2s) edge between X and Y.
The set of routes of an AS is classified into own routes,
provider routes, customer routes, and peer routes [1]. Let r be
a route of AS X. r is X’s own route if all edges in r are s2s
edges. r is a customer/provider/peer route if the first non-s2s
edge is a p2c/c2p/p2p edge.
ASes usually conform to the following common export
policies when exporting their routes to neighbors.
• An AS exports its own routes and its customer routes to
its providers and peers. It does not export its provider
routes and peer routes to its providers or peers.
• An AS exports all of its routes to its customers and
siblings.
An AS path is valley-free if it satisfies the condition that a
p2c edge or p2p edge is only followed by p2c or s2s edges.
Gao [1] proved that if all ASes follow the common export
policies, then all AS paths are valley-free. It has been found
that some AS paths in BGP updates and BGP routing tables
are not valley-free [10], [8], [9], implying that some ASes do
not conform to the common export policies.
Identifying valley paths requires the knowledge of AS re-
lationships. Since AS relationships are not publicly disclosed,
some studies have used inferred AS relationships to identify
valley paths [10], [8]. This may result in false negatives
and false positives because inferred AS relationships are not
accurate. The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that
on the one hand detecting valley paths (which arise because
some ASes violate the common export policies) requires
knowledge of AS relationships, on the other hand inferring
AS relationships assumes that ASes obey the common export
policies in the first place [17].
We argue that it is difficult to accurately infer AS relation-
ships for two reasons. First, some ASes do not conform to the
common export policies, either due to BGP misconfigurations
or due to complex business relationships. As a result, we
cannot rely on the patterns of valley-free paths to accurately
infer AS relationships. Second, the BGP data made publicly
available by projects like Route Views [18] and RIPE RIS
[19] provide only a partial view of the Internet’s routing
system because the data are collected from a limited number
of vantage points [20]. While it is difficult to accurately infer
AS relationships, it is possible and useful to compute observed
AS relationships (i.e., AS relationships revealed by the BGP
data). In the next two sections, we present an algorithm
for computing observed AS relationships and describe how
observed AS relationships can be used to identify policy
violating ASes.
IV. COMPUTING OBSERVED AS RELATIONSHIPS
In this section, we present an algorithm for computing
observed AS relationships using BGP data provided by the
Route Views Project [18]. The input to our algorithm is a set
of BGP routing table dumps collected by Route Views (RV)
routers. Each routing table dump contains BGP routing table
entries collected from multiple vantage points (i.e., ASes that
peer with an RV router). Each vantage point (VP) provides
an AS-level view of the Internet from its perspective. The set
of AS paths collected from one VP is referred to as the VP’s
view.
Given a set of BGP routing table dumps, our algorithm
first preprocesses the data and then computes the observed
AS relationships in two phases as detailed below.
A. Preprocessing Data
We first extract IPv4 AS paths from the BGP routing table
dumps. We then sanitize the AS paths as follows. First, if
an AS path contains an AS set at the end of the path, we
remove the AS set if it contains more than one AS numbers
(ASNs). Otherwise, we keep the single ASN in the set as
the last ASN in the path. Second, we discard AS paths that
contain invalid ASNs. An ASN is invalid if it is unallocated
or reserved. Allocations of ASNs is published by IANA [21]
and we use it to identify invalid ASNs. Third, we discard AS
paths that contain loops. An AS path contains a loop if an ASN
appears more than once in the path and the appearances are
not adjacent to each other. For example, AS path <A B C B
D> contains a loop and will be discarded. Last, we remove the
duplicate ASNs that arise from AS prepending. For example,
AS path <A B B B C> becomes <A B C> after duplicate
ASNs are removed.
B. Phase One: Processing AS Paths Containing a Tier-1 AS
Our algorithm computes observed AS relationships in two
phases. In phase one, we process the set of AS paths that
contain a Tier-1 AS. This set is denoted by S1.
To compute observed AS relationships, we maintain two
counters, cnt(X,Y ) and cnt(Y,X), for each pair of ASes
X and Y that are adjacent in an AS path. Both counters are
initialized to 0. If we observe X provide transit for Y in an
AS path, then we increase cnt(X,Y ) by 1. If we observe
Y provide transit for X in an AS path, then we increase
cnt(Y,X) by 1. Basically, cnt(X,Y ) counts the number of
times we observe X provide transit for Y and cnt(Y,X) counts
the number of times we observe Y provide transit for X.
In order to determine the transit relationships between
adjacent pairs of ASes in an AS path, we need to know the
top provider of the AS path (i.e., the AS that is located at the
highest level of the routing hierarchy). If two adjacent ASes X
and Y appear before the top provider, then Y provides transit
for X. If they appear after the top provider, then X provides
transit for Y.
Every AS path in S1 contains a Tier-1 AS, so the first
Tier-1 AS in the path is the top provider. We process every
path p in S1 to update the counters as follows. Let p =<
A1 A2 · · · An > and let Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) be the first Tier-
1 AS in p. We know that Ai provides transit for Ai−1 for
2 ≤ i ≤ j and Ai provides transit for Ai+1 for j ≤ i ≤ n−1.
Thus, we increase cnt(Ai, Ai−1) by 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ j and we
increase cnt(Ai, Ai+1) by 1 for j ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
1) Determining Observed AS Relationships: We say an
edge between X and Y is visible from a VP A if A’s view
contains an AS path in which X and Y are adjacent. The
common export policies described in Section III imply the
following: 1) A p2c edge from X to Y is visible by X’s
upstream providers; 2) An s2s edge between X and Y is visible
by their upstream providers; 3) A p2p edge between X and
Y is not visible by their upstream providers. These further
imply that if an edge is visible from a Tier-1 AS A, this edge
can be a p2c edge, an s2s edge, or a p2p edge adjacent to
A, but it cannot be a p2p edge between two non-Tier-1 ASes.
This leads to the following rules for determining observed AS
relationships based on the values of the two counters.
• If cnt(X,Y ) > 0 and cnt(Y,X) = 0, then X and Y have
p2c relationship, i.e., X is a provider of Y.
• If cnt(X,Y ) > 0 and cnt(Y,X) > 0 and X or Y (or
both) is a Tier-1 AS, then X and Y have p2p relationship.
• If cnt(X,Y ) > 0 and cnt(Y,X) > 0 and both X and Y
are non-Tier-1 ASes, then X and Y have s2s relationship.
The set of observed AS relationships computed in this phase
is denoted by R1. These AS relationships are computed based
on transit relationships observed from AS paths that contain
a Tier-1 AS. Given R1, we can classify every AS path in
our dataset as determined or undetermined. An AS path is
determined if the relationship for every adjacent pair of ASes
in the path is known (i.e., the relationship exists in R1). An
AS path is undetermined if it contains at least one pair of
ASes whose relationship is unknown.
C. Phase Two: Processing Undetermined AS Paths
Let S2 denote the set of undetermined AS paths. In phase
two, we process the paths in S2 to resolve all unknown AS
relationships. Note that an undetermined AS path does not
contain any Tier-1 AS because all AS paths that contain a
Tier-1 AS are determined.
1) Finding the Top Provider of an AS path: The key to
resolving unknown AS relationships in undetermined AS paths
is to find the top provider in these paths. Once the top provider
of an AS path is determined, it is straightforward to determine
the transit relationships between adjacent pairs of ASes in the
path. Gao’s algorithm [1] relies on AS degree to determine
the top provider. Specifically, the first largest degree AS in an
AS path is considered to be the top provider. We propose a
more reliable way of finding the top provider by considering a
new AS attribute named distance. The distance attribute of an
AS indicates its minimum distance from a Tier-1 AS and can
be calculated as follows. We construct an undirected graph G
in which the nodes represent the ASes that appear in the AS
paths in our dataset. We add an edge between two nodes in G
if the two nodes are adjacent in an AS path. All Tier-1 nodes
have distance 0. To find the distance of a non-Tier-1 node v,
we compute the shortest path from v to any Tier-1 node, and
the length of the path (in hops) is the distance of v.
In a p2c relationship, typically the provider has larger degree
and smaller distance than the customer. However, violations
of the degree and distance rules exist. To determine the
frequency of such violations, we examine the ground truth
AS relationships collected in [7]. We find that 1.08% of the
p2c relationships violate the degree rule (i.e., the provider
has smaller degree than the customer) and 0.82% violate the
distance rule (i.e., the distance of the provider is bigger than
the distance of the customer). Since distance violation is less
frequent than degree violation, we believe using the distance
attribute to identify the top provider is more reliable than using
the degree attribute.
Given an AS path p ∈ S2, we find the AS in p that has the
smallest distance and let it be the top provider of p. In case
multiple ASes have the same smallest distance, we break the
tie as follows. We divide the ASes with the smallest distance
into groups of consecutive ASes and let the largest degree
AS in the last group be the top provider of p. For example,
consider an AS path <A, B, C, D, E, F, G> in which C,
E, and F have the smallest distance. These 3 ASes fall into
two groups, the first group contains C and the second group
contains E and F. E and F belong to the last group, so the one
with the larger degree is the top provider. In case of a tie in
degree, the first largest degree AS in the last group is chosen
as the top provider. That is, E is the top provider if E and F
have the same degree.
The reason for choosing the top provider from the last group
of smallest distance ASes is the following. Consider an AS
path for a specific prefix. The BGP updates for the prefix
are originated by the last AS in the AS path and propagated
from right to left among the ASes in the path. In the above
example, BGP updates for a prefix in G are originated by G
and then propagated to F, E, D, and so on. Thus, the largest
degree node in the last group of smallest distance nodes should
be the top provider for traffic destined for the prefix in G.
Suppose E is the top provider. The path segment <C, D, E>
shows that the top provider E propagates an update down the
routing hierarchy to D, which then propagates the update up
the routing hierarchy to C (note that D has larger distance than
C and E). This indicates that a valley exists in the path. While
both our algorithm and Gao’s algorithm [1] rely on the top
provider to determine transit relationships between adjacent
pairs of ASes in an AS path, our algorithm is different from
Gao’s algorithm in two ways. First, we choose the top provider
based on the distance attribute (with tie breaking using the
degree attribute) while Gao relies on the degree attribute to
pick the top provider. Second, Gao assumes AS paths are
valley-free. As a result, at most one of the edges adjacent
to the top provider in an AS path can be inferred as p2p.
In contrast, we do not assume valley-free paths. As a result,
both edges adjacent to the top provider in an AS path may be
observed as p2p.
2) Resolving Unknown AS Relationships: To resolve all the
unknown relationships, we sequentially process all AS paths
in S2 as follows. Let p =< A1 A2 · · · An > be an AS path in
S2 and let Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) be the top provider of p determined
using the above method. We increase cnt(Ai, Ai−1) by 1 for
2 ≤ i ≤ j if the relationship of Ai and Ai−1 is unknown. That
is, Ai provides transit for Ai−1 if they appear before the top
provider. We increase cnt(Ai, Ai+1) by 1 for j ≤ i ≤ n − 1
if the relationship of Ai and Ai+1 is unknown. That is, Ai
provides transit for Ai+1 if they appear after the top provider.
After we process all paths in S2, we go through two steps to
resolve unknown AS relationships. In the first step, we use the
following rules to assign AS relationships to AS pairs based
on the values of the two counters.
• If cnt(X,Y ) > 0 and cnt(Y,X) = 0, then X and Y have
p2c relationship, i.e., X is a provider of Y.
• If cnt(X,Y ) > 0 and cnt(Y,X) > 0, then X and Y have
p2p relationship.
If cnt(X,Y ) > 0 and cnt(Y,X) > 0, then X and Y can
have either p2p or s2s relationship. If the link between X and Y
is not visible by any upstream provider, then X and Y have p2p
relationship, otherwise they have s2s relationship. In the first
step, we temporally assign p2p relationship if cnt(X,Y ) > 0
and cnt(Y,X) > 0. In the second step, we change some p2p
relationships to s2s as follows. We examine each path in S2.
If the path contains a p2p link and the p2p link is not adjacent
to the top provider of the path, then we change the link type
to s2s because the link is visible by an upstream provider (i.e.,
the top provider). For example, consider the AS path <A B C
D E F> where C is the top provider. If D and E is assigned p2p
relationship in the first step, then we change their relationship
to s2s in the second step. At the end of the second step, we
have resolved all unknown AS relationships, and the set of
resolved AS relationships is denoted by R2.
In summary, our algorithm computes a set of observed AS
relationships R = R1 ∪ R2 in two phases. In phase one, we
compute the set R1 by processing AS paths that contain a
Tier-1 AS. The top provider of each of these paths is a Tier-1
AS. In the second phase, we compute the set R2 by processing
undetermined AS paths according to R1. For these AS paths,
we pick the largest degree node in the last group of consecutive
smallest distance nodes as the top provider. The set R = R1∪
R2 contains the observed AS relationships for all AS pairs
that appear in the AS paths in our dataset.
V. IDENTIFYING POLICY VIOLATING NODES USING
OBSERVED AS RELATIONSHIPS
An AS that does not conform to the common export policies
is referred to as a policy violating node (PVN). In this section
we present two ways of identifying PVNs using observed AS
relationships.
A. Comparing Observed AS Relationships with Actual AS
Relationships
We can identify PVNs by comparing observed AS rela-
tionships with the ground truth AS relationships. The largest
source of ground truth AS relationships to date was assembled
by Luckie et al. [7]. Their dataset contains around 47,000 p2p
and p2c relationships. For a pair of ASes (X, Y), the observed
AS relationship could be different from the ground truth AS
relationship and the mismatch can be classified into four types.
• Type 1: The observed relationship is p2c but the actual
relationship is p2p. The observed relationship of (X, Y)
is p2c means that we observe X provide transit for Y but
we do not observe Y provide transit for X. The mismatch
is due to incomplete data. That is, Route Views routers
peer with a limited number of VPs and the views from
these VPs do not allow us to observe p2p relationship
for (X, Y). This type of mismatch can be reduced if the
number of VPs increase. In particular, if a new VP reveals
an AS path in which Y provides transit for X, then we
would be able to observe the p2p relationship between X
and Y.
• Type 2: The observed relationship is s2s but the
actual relationship is p2p. The fact that the observed
relationship is s2s indicates that the p2p link between X
and Y is visible from an upstream provider. This means
that X or Y (or both) has violated the common export
policies by exporting its peer route to a provider.
• Type 3: The observed relationship is p2p or s2s but
the actual relationship is p2c (i.e., X is provider of
Y). This means that the actual customer Y has violated
the common export policies by exporting a route learned
from provider X to a peer or provider, causing us to
observe Y provide transit for X in addition to observe X
provide transit for Y. As a result, the observed relationship
for (X, Y) is p2p or s2s.
• Type 4: The observed relationship is c2p (i.e., X is
customer of Y) but the actual relationships is p2c
(i.e., X is provider of Y). This means that the actual
customer Y has has violated the common export policies
by exporting a route learned from provider X to a peer
or provider, causing us to observe Y provide transit for
X. This is similar to the Type 3 mismatch; the only
difference is that here we do not observe X provide transit
for Y, so the observed relationship of (X, Y) is c2p.
The above classification of mismatches shows that there are
two causes for mismatches between observed AS relationships
and actual AS relationships: 1) There is insufficient data for
us to observe the actual AS relationship; 2) Some AS has
violated the common export policies. Type 1 mismatch is due
to incomplete data and the other three types of mismatch are
due to policy violation by some AS. In a type 2 mismatch, one
or both peers are PVNs and in a type 3 or type 4 mismatch,
the actual customer is the PVN.
1) Discussion: A common approach to identifying PVNs
is to find valleys in AS paths [10], [8], [9]. An AS path that
violates the valley-free condition contains one or more of the
following four types of valleys.
1) p2c-c2p: a p2c edge is followed by a c2p edge.
2) p2p-c2p: a p2p edge is followed by a c2p edge.
3) p2c-p2p: a p2c edge is followed by a p2p edge.
4) p2p-p2p: a p2p edge is followed by a p2p edge.
We use X>Y to denote X is a provider of Y, X<Y to
denote X is a customer of Y, and X−Y to denote X and
Y are peers. Then the above four types of valleys can be
written as X>V<Y, X−V<Y, X>V−Y, and X−V−Y, where
X, V, and Y are the ASes involved in the valley. In all four
cases, the middle AS V is a PVN. Specifically, in X>V<Y,
V exports a route learned from provider Y to provider X. In
X−V<Y, V exports a route learned from provider Y to peer
X. In X>V−Y, V exports a route learned from peer Y to
provider X. In X−V−Y, V exports a route learned from peer
Y to peer X.
In order to identify PVNs by finding valleys in AS paths, we
need knowledge of AS relationships. Since AS relationships
are not publicly disclosed, prior studies use either inferred AS
relationships [10], [8] or partial ground truth AS relationships
[9]. Both approaches have their limitations. Identifying valleys
using inferred relationships can produce false positives and
false negatives due to inaccuracy of inferred AS relationships.
For example, if an AS path contains the segment A>O−B
according to inferred AS relationships, then O is identified
as a PVN. If the actual AS relationship between O and B is
O>B, then O is not a PVN. Here, a node identified as a PVN is
actually a policy conforming AS (i.e., false positive). Consider
another example, suppose an AS path contains the segment
A>O>B according to inferred AS relationships, so O is not
identified as a PVN. If the actual AS relationship between O
and B is O−B, then O is actually a PVN. Here, a node not
identified as a PVN is actually a PVN (i.e., false negative).
These examples show that using inferred AS relationships
cannot reliably identify PVNs.
To address the inaccuracy of inferred AS relationships,
Giotsas and Zhou [9] extract ground truth AS relationships
from routing policies encoded in BGP community attribute.
They are able to extract AS relationships of more than 30%
of the AS links and analyze the valley-free violations using
this partial truth data. This approach has two limitations. First,
it cannot identify all valleys due to the the lack of complete
truth data. Second, sometimes the PVN cannnot be identified
even though a valley is found in an AS path. For example,
suppose an AS path contains the segment A>B?C<D. Here
B?C means the actual AS relationship between B and C is
unknown. This segment contains a valley, however, we cannot
identify the PVN without knowing the actual AS relationship
between B and C. Specifically, C is the PVN if B>C and B
is the PVN if B<C.
Using observed AS relationships, we can identify PVNs
without identifying valleys in AS paths. By comparing ob-
served AS relationships with the actual AS relationships, we
can identify the PVNs from type 2, type 3, and type 4
mismatches. Since we do not have complete ground truth
AS relationship data, we are not able to identify all PVNs.
However, the observed AS relationships can be made available
to the network operators to enable them to identify policy
violations. Suppose an network operator is provided with the
observed AS relationships between its AS and its neighboring
ASes, the operator can compare the observed AS relationship
with the actual AS relationship for each neighboring AS. If
the operator’s AS is found to be a PVN in a type 2, type 3,
or type 4 mismatch, then the operator should determine if the
violation of the common export policies is intentional (i.e.,
due to special economic models) or unintentional (i.e., due to
BGP misconfigurations). If the policy violation is intentional,
then no corrective action is needed. Otherwise, the operator
should identify BGP misconfigurations and correct them.
B. Finding P2P-P2P Valleys
While comparing observed AS relationships with actual AS
relationships can identify PVNs that export a peer route to a
provider (type 2 mismatch) and PVNs that export a provider
route to a provider or peer (type 3 and type 4 mismatches),
it cannot identify PVNs that export a peer route to a peer. To
identify such PVNs, we need to find X−V−Y valleys in AS
paths using the observed AS relationships and identify V as
a PVN. Note that V may not be an actual PVN because the
actual AS relationship between X and V and between V and Y
may not be p2p. If the operator of V is given a set of X−V−Y
valleys that it is involved in, it can then check if it has p2p
relationship with both X and Y. If yes, V is indeed a PVN and
the operator should identify and correct BGP misconfiguration
if the X−V−Y valley is not intentional. For example, an AS V
can play the role of a mediate AS that allows two ASes X and
Y to peer with each other through it. In this case the X−V−Y
valley is intentional and no corrective action is needed.
In summary, PVNs that export a peer route to a provider
and PVNs that export a provider route to a provider or peer
can be identified by comparing observed AS relationships with
the actual AS relationships. PVNs that export a peer route to
another peer can be identified by finding p2p-p2p valleys using
observed AS relationships. Thus, observed AS relationships
provide useful information for network operators to identify
policy violations and subsequently identify and correct BGP
misconfigurations if the policy violation is unintentional. We
plan to create a website that allows a user to enter an ASN
and obtain the observed AS relationships between the AS and
its neighbors as well as a list of p2p-p2p valleys in which
the AS is a PVN. This information allows network operators
to identify policy violations by their ASes. The website
will also allow network operators to report identified policy
violations and their causes (i.e., deliberate policy for complex
AS relationships or BGP misconfiguration). The collected data
on policy violations and their causes will allow us to gain a
better understanding of complex AS relationships and routing
policies associated with them.
Observed AS relationships can also help Internet researchers
to understand the extent to which the publicly available BGP
data can reveal the actual relationships between ASes.
VI. RESULTS
We use BGP routing table dumps collected by all Route
Views routers on May 1, 2014 at 02:00 to compute observed
AS relationships. Our dataset contains around 7.58 million
unique AS paths collected from 632 VPs. We manually
identify 16 Tier-1 ASes according to Wikipedia [22]; 12 of
these Tier-1 ASes are VPs. A total of 136,559 observed AS
relationships are computed from our dataset.
A. Observed AS Relationships in Phase One
The set R1 computed in phase one contains 91,210 observed
AS relationships. These include 90,417 (99.13%) p2c relation-
ships, 197 (0.22%) p2p relationships, and 596 (0.65%) s2s
relationships. All p2p links observed in phase one are adjacent
to Tier-1 ASes.
We compare R1 with the ground truth AS relationships
collected by Luckie et al. [7]. Their dataset consists of two
sets of ground truth AS relationships. The first set, denoted by
Tcomm, contains over 41,000 p2c and p2p relationships derived
from BGP community attributes in BGP route announcements.
The second set, denoted by TRPSL, contains over 6,500 p2c
relationships derived from routing policies stored in public
databases using the Routing Policy Specification Language
(RPSL). Tcomm and TRPSL have 1,430 overlapping rela-
tionships, out of which 6 do not agree. We remove these
6 relationships from Tcomm and TRPSL and compute the
union of the two sets. The union, denoted by Tall, contains
46,698 AS relationships, including 16,243 p2p relationships
and 30,455 p2c relationships.
R1 and Tall have 20,873 overlapping relationships, out of
which 19,960 (95.63%) relationships match. The 913 mis-
matches can be classified into four types, as shown in Table
I. We see in the table that the most frequent type of mismatch
is type 1, which occurs 774 (84.78%) times. Thus, most
of the mismathes are due to incomplete data, which causes
p2p relationships to be observed as p2c relationships. Such
mismatches can be recuced by increasing the number of VPs.
There are 16 type 2 mismatches, which are caused by one or
both peers violating the common export policies. There are
101 type 3 mismatches and 22 type 4 mismatches, both of
which are caused by the actual customer violating the common
export policies.
TABLE I
MISMATCHES BETWEEN OBSERVED AS RELATIONSHIPS IN PHASE ONE
AND GROUND TRUTH
Type of obs=p2c obs=s2s obs=s2s/p2p obs=c2p
Mismatch truth=p2p truth=p2p truth=p2c truth=p2c
#Occurrences 774 16 101 22
Percentage 84.78% 1.75% 11.06% 2.41%
To understand how actual p2p relationships are observed
from the BGP data, we examine the overlapping p2p re-
lationships between Tall and R1. We find 903 overlapping
p2p relationships, which can be classified into three types:
match (i.e., observed relationship is p2p), observed as p2c,
and observed as s2s. The number of occurrences and the
percentage of each type are shown in Table II. We see that
85.71% of the overlapping p2p relationships are observed as
p2c. This means that a large fraction of the p2p links adjacent
to Tier-1 ASes are observed as p2c links due to the limited
number of VPs.
TABLE II
OVERLAPPING P2P RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN Tall AND R1
Match Observed as p2c Observed as s2s
113 (12.51%) 774 (85.71%) 16 (1.77%)
To understand how actual p2c relationships are observed
from the BGP data, we examine the overlapping p2c rela-
tionships between Tall and R1. We find 19,970 overlapping
p2c relationships, which can be classified into three types:
match, observed as p2p or s2s, and observed as c2p. The
number of occurrences and the percentage of each type are
shown in Table III. We see that 99.38% of the overlapping
p2c relationships match and the rest are mismatches caused
by policy violations of the customers in the p2c relationships.
The results show that policy violations cause a very small
percentage of the p2c links to be observed as other types.
TABLE III
OVERLAPPING P2C RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN Tall AND R1
Match Observed as p2p/s2s Observed as c2p
19,847 (99.38%) 101 (0.51%) 22 (0.11%)
B. Observed AS Relationships in Phase Two
The set R2 computed in phase two contains 45,349 observed
AS relationships, out of which there are 41,462 (91.43%)
p2c relationships, 2,264 (4.99%) p2p relationships, and 1,623
(3.58%) s2s relationships. The p2p links observed in this
phase are between non-Tier-1 ASes. We observe many more
p2p links in phase two than in phase one (2,264 vs. 197),
indicating that more peering occurs at lower level of the
routing hierarchy.
R2 and Tall have 6,521 overlapping relationships, out of
which 5,516 relationships do not match. The number of oc-
currences and the percentage of the four types of mismatches
are shown in Table IV. We see that the most frequent type
of mismatch is type 1, which occurs 5,123 (92.88%) times.
Thus, most of the mismatches are due to incomplete data,
which causes p2p relationships to be observed as p2c. This is
consistent with the findings in [23], [24], [5] that the public
view misses a large number of p2p links, especially p2p links
between lower tier ASes. In order to observe a p2p relationship
between X and Y, we need a VP in X or X’s downstream
customer and a VP in Y or Y’s downstream customer. Since
there are only a limited number of VPs and most of the VPs
are located at higher levels of the routing hierarchy [20], we
are only able to observe a small fraction of the p2p links
between non-Tier-1 ASes. The second most frequent type of
mismatch is type 2, which occurs 364 times. Here, a p2p
relationship is observed as an s2s relationship because one or
both peers export the peer route to a provider, causing the p2p
link to be visible by an upstream provider. There are 13 type
3 mismatches and 16 type 4 mismatches, both of which are
caused by the customer violating the common export policies.
TABLE IV
MISMATCHES BETWEEN OBSERVED AS RELATIONSHIPS IN PHASE TWO
AND GROUND TRUTH
Type of obs=p2c obs=s2s obs=s2s/p2p obs=c2p
Mismatch truth=p2p truth=p2p truth=p2c truth=p2c
#Occurrences 5,123 364 13 16
Percentage 92.88% 6.60% 0.24% 0.29%
Tall and R2 have 6,050 overlapping p2p relationships. The
three types of these p2p relationships are shown in Table V.
We see that 84.68% of the overlapping p2p relationships are
observed as p2c, indicating that a large fraction of the p2p
links between non-Tier-1 ASes are observed as p2c links due
to the limited number of VPs.
Tall and R2 have 471 overlapping p2c relationships. The
three types of these p2c relationships are shown in Table VI.
We see that 93.84% of the overlapping p2c relationships match
and the rest are mismatches caused by policy violations of
the customers in the p2c relationships. The results show that
TABLE V
OVERLAPPING P2P RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN Tall AND R2
Match Observed as p2c Observed as s2s
563 (9.31%) 5123 (84.68%) 364 (6.02%)
policy violations cause a small percentage of the p2c links to
be observed as other types.
TABLE VI
OVERLAPPING P2C RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN Tall AND R2
Match Observed as p2p/s2s Observed as c2p
442 (93.84%) 13 (2.76%) 16 (3.40%)
In phase two, we use distance-based approach to find the
top provider in an AS path. That is, we choose the largest
degree node in the last group of consecutive smallest distance
nodes to be the top provider. An alternative approach is degree-
based [1], which selects the first largest degree node in an AS
path as the top provider. We compared the two approaches
and found that the distance-based approach is more reliable.
Specifically, with degree-based approach, the resulting R2 has
474 matches with Tall. On the other hand, the distance-based
approach results in 1005 matches, which is over two times of
the matches produced by the degree-based approach.
C. Policy Violating Nodes
1) Identifying PVNs by Comparing Observed AS Relation-
ships with the Truth: Given the set R = R1 ∪R2 of observed
AS relationships, we can identify PVNs by comparing R with
Tall to find type 2, type 3, and type 4 mismatches. For a
type 2 mismatch, one or both ASes are PVNs. For a type
3 or type 4 mismatch, the actual customer is the PVN. We
obtain 380 type 2 mismatches by comparing R and Tall, from
which we identify 154 candidate PVNs. In a type 2 mismatch,
one or both peers violate the common export policies by
exporting a peer route to a provider, so we identify both peers
as candidate PVNs. By comparing R and Tall, we find 114
type 3 mismatches and 38 type 4 mismatches, from which we
identify 142 PVNs. These PVNs violate the common export
policies by exporting a provider route to a provider or peer.
Note that our set of identified PVNs is a proper subset of
all the PVNs because we do not have complete ground truth
AS relationship data. Specifically, only 20% of our observed
AS relationships can be found in Tall.
2) Identifying PVNs by Finding P2P-P2P Valleys: As noted
in Section V-B, PVNs that export a peer route to a peer cannot
be identified by comparing observed AS relationships with
the truth because the policy violation does not result in a
mismatch. In order to find such PVNs, we need to find p2p-
p2p valleys in AS paths and identify the node adjacent to both
p2p links as the PVN.
Using R1, we find 69,978 p2p-p2p valleys and 18 PVNs in
the set S1 of AS paths we process in phase one. To understand
how mismatches between observed AS relationships and actual
AS relationships affect the results, we replace the observed
AS relationships with the actual AS relationships when there
is a mismatch and the resulting AS relationships are referred
to as the corrected AS relationships. Using corrected AS
relationships, we find 107,587 p2p-p2p valleys and 49 PVNs
in S1. The results are shown in Table VII. We see that using
observed AS relationships fails to identify a large number of
p2p-p2p valleys and PVNs as compared to using corrected
AS relationships. This is because 790 p2p links are observed
as p2c or s2s links so that p2p-p2p valleys involving these
p2p links cannot be identified. We find that all 18 PVNs
identified using observed AS relationships belong to the set of
49 PVNs identified using corrected AS relationships. That is,
using observed AS relationships produces zero false positives
and 31 false negatives. Another finding is that all 16 Tier-1
ASes are PVNs. This means that it is common for Tier-1 ASes
to export a peer route to another peer.
Using the set of observed AS relationships R1 ∪ R2, we
find no p2p-p2p valleys in the set S2 of AS paths we process
in phase two. This is because 5,487 p2p links are observed as
p2c or s2s in phase two. To identify p2p valleys, we modify
our algorithm in phase two so that we do not assign s2s rela-
tionships. That is, if cnt(X,Y ) > 0 and cnt(Y,X) > 0, then
we assign p2p relationship to (X, Y). With this modification,
we identify 10,116 p2p-p2p valleys and 103 PVNs. On the
other hand, using corrected AS relationships results in 42,748
identified valleys and 134 identified PVNs, as shown in Table
VII. The set of observed PVNs and the set of corrected PVNs
have 100 common PVNs. This means that using observed AS
relationships to identify PVNs results in 3 false positives and
34 false negatives.
TABLE VII
P2P-P2P VALLEYS AND PVNS IDENTIFIED BY OBSERVED AS
RELATIONSHIPS AND CORRECTED AS RELATIONSHIPS
#p2p-p2p valleys #PVNs
S1 observed 69,978 18
S1 corrected 107,587 49
S2 observed 10,116 103
S2 corrected 42,748 134
D. Summary
We make the following conclusions from our results. First,
a large fraction of p2p links are observed as p2c links due to
incomplete data from a limited number of VPs. As a result,
inferring AS relationships from BGP data can overestimate
the number of p2c links and underestimate the number of
p2p links. Second, most of the mismatches between observed
AS relationships and actual AS relationships are caused by
incomplete data. The other mismatches are caused by policy
violations and can be used to identify ASes that export a peer
route to a provider and ASes that export a provider route to a
provider or peer. Third, observed AS relationships can be used
to identify ASes that export a peer route to a peer by finding
p2p-p2p valleys in AS paths. The identified PVNs are highly
likely to be correct (i.e., false positive rate is low). However,
it can fail to identify some PVNs because many p2p links are
observed as p2c links.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present an algorithm for computing ob-
served AS relationships using publicly available BGP data. We
argue that it is difficult to accurately infer AS relationships
using BGP data due to two reasons. First, some ASes do not
conform to the common export policies. As a result, not all
AS paths are valley-free. Second, publicly available BGP data
provide only a partial view of the Internet’s routing system
because the data are collected from a limited number of VPs.
Instead of inferring AS relationships, we compute observed
AS relationships based on transit relationships between ASes
that are revealed by BGP data. We show that the observed AS
relationships can be used to identify policy violating nodes by
finding mismatches with the actual AS relationships and by
identifying p2p-p2p valleys in AS paths.
In our future work, we plan to create a website that allows
users to obtain the observed AS relationships and the p2p-p2p
valleys for a given ASN. This information allows network
operators to identify policy violations of their ASes. The
website will also allow network operators to report identified
policy violations and their causes, based on which we will
study complex AS relationships and their associated export
policies.
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